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1. Introduction 
 
Separation of powers has been seen as a key feature of modern democratic governance.  
Most constitutions adhere to this doctrine in their designs of institutions (legislative, 
executive and judiciary). The same philosophy is also reflected in the design of many 
other organisations like regulatory and enforcement bodies, ministries and governmental 
departments. 
Separation of powers can be analysed by exploring its structural as well as functional 
aspects. From a structural perspective, separation can be seen as a device against 
regulatory capture and rent seeking behaviour. Even though the general idea is not new1, 
it is only recently that economic theorists have addressed this topic using agency 
theoretic framework. These institutions can be viewed as agencies entrusted with certain 
tasks. To perform these tasks, they are endowed with some power as well. If too many 
tasks are given to one agency, then the agency is likely to enjoy greater power also. That 
would encourage collusive and rent seeking behaviour. In a recent paper, Laffont and 
Meleu (2001) have modelled separation of powers as an instrument against corruption 
and have shown that the value of such separation is higher in developing countries. The 
characteristics of developing countries make separation of powers more desirable but at 
the same time more difficult to implement. We address the closely related issue of 
activism. 
Our analysis of activism is based on a distinction between tasks and privileges. Members 
of an institution receive explicit incentive payments for their performance in the tasks, 
but similar incentive payments do not exist for privileges. However, in addition to their 
own tasks, institutions are granted privileges so that they can have access to information 
or decision making process of other institutions. In this context, we define activism as an 
institution extending its mechanism of decision-making, on the grounds of privilege, into 
problems that are the forte of some other institution. In many ways, such privileges act as 
checks and balances. As we shall see, activism can raise welfare by reducing the cost of 
collusion-proofness, but it can turn excessive and can lead to welfare reduction.  
                                                 
1 Laffont (2000) contains a rich and scholarly treatment of these issues. See Moe (1986), Wilson  (1980) for 
earlier contributions. 
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Modelling activism poses a unique problem- in the sense that we don’t have a proper 
theory of power.  In the standard mechanism design problem, an ideal constitution would 
specify all decisions to be taken (in all contingencies). Hence it does not matter who takes 
those decisions and power is irrelevant. One can depart from the paradigm in two ways. 
One would be to allow for information asymmetry and control over information by the 
agency. This way, information rent would be the source of power. The other approach 
would be to adopt an incomplete contract framework where institutions are given 
decision rights. We follow the former approach here. Following, Laffont and Meleu 
(2001) and Laffont and Martimort (1999), we analyse activism in a regulatory 
framework. We are interested in the positive as well as normative aspects of activism. We 
try to see when activism is more likely to surface and what its implications for social 
welfare are.  
Our analysis is consistent with the functional interpretation also.  The different decision-
making bodies of the State (legislature, executive and judiciary) are endowed with 
specific powers and are required to carry out different tasks. These institutions differ in 
terms of operating principles, stipulated objectives and the nature of information 
processing.  Hence different institutions are best equipped to solve different decision 
problems facing the state, depending on the information requirements and the cost of 
information processing2. For example, the legislature can be thought of as the body best 
suited to obtain information on the preferences of the population.  Hence it is supposed to 
enact laws to suit the best interest of the population. On the other hand, for the judiciary, 
the population preference is not of paramount importance; rather it is supposed to gather 
judicial information from contesting parties and take decisions which are deemed to be 
fair3. At a different level, the executive can be thought to be in charge of gathering and 
processing technical, statistical information so as to implement the will of the legislature 
in the most efficient manner.   
                                                 
2 This is very similar to the analyses in the law and economics literature of the different choices faced by 
the state in allocating resources (i.e. property rule vs. liability rule). See Calabresi and Melamed (1972); 
Kaplow and Shavell (1996). 
3 Some of these differences and their implications have been recently modelled by Maskin and Tirole 
(2001). They study the optimal allocation of power between accountable and non-accountable branches of 
the state. 
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Hence, according to this interpretation, we are likely to see separation of powers even 
when there is no rent seeking behaviour or collusion possibility. Activism is possible in 
such an environment but it is unlikely to be of a large magnitude and raise concerns. To 
study activism, we superimpose the possibility of collusive and corrupt behaviour on 
such a framework. We take the separation of power structure to be given and we do not 
seek to show it optimality; rather we try to analyse the optimality (or the opposite) of 
activism. This also makes our analysis more relevant to the developing economies where 
corruption has been rampant and has threatened the developmental process. 
The next section has a brief discussion of judicial activism in India. This is not to suggest 
that there can not be any other form of activism. We can have a legislative as well as 
executive activism4. However, judicial activism has attracted maximum attention. Section 
3 presents the basic model and section 4 contains the analysis of activism by a single 
institution. We show that limited activism (activism by benevolent supervisors) raises 
welfare. But as corruption level rises the non-benevolent supervisors also pursue activist 
policies and this can reduce welfare. Section 5 extends the analysis to discuss activism by 
more than one institution. Section 6 concludes with few brief remarks. 
2. Judicial Activism in India5 
 
Judicial Activism in India has been perceived in certain quarters as a success of 
constitutional governance, while others have sought to condemn it. There is a popular 
perception that institutions like the legislature and executive branches of the government 
have not performed efficiently due to the rise of corruption and nepotism.  Hence the 
intervention and activist policy by the Supreme Court has been seen as a welcome relief 
to many. Our objective is not to debate the merit of such a policy on a case by case basis; 
we are interested in looking at the general process6. 
                                                 
4 Recently, members of the Parliament were given large sums of money for development of their 
constituencies. This can be seen as taking over the developmental and implementation role of the district or 
state administrations. Similarly, various loan waiver and other populist programmes can best be viewed as 
legislative activism. 
5 India is probably the only developing economy where judicial activism has received some attention. In the 
developed economies, judicial activism has been a debated issue in the legal and political spheres. See 
O’Connor (1997), Allan (1997), Lens (2001) among others. 
6 This section draws heavily from previous work by one of the authors; see Anant and Singh (2002). 
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 The appearance of judicial activism in India can be functionally correlated with the 
emergence of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the late 1970s. In a series of cases, the 
Supreme Court enlarged its reach and jurisdiction in two ways: one, by re-interpreting the 
constitution to expand the scope and content of various fundamental rights, and two, by 
moderating the ancient requirement of locus standi for access to judicial remedies and 
redress. As a consequence, procedural requirements were eased to enable individuals or 
organisations to approach the Supreme Court and High Courts on the behalf of those 
unable to do so themselves - “in the public interest”. Typically these cases dealt with 
gross violation of rights - many of them involving women as victims in prisons and 
remand homes7, abysmal work conditions faced by poor and bonded labour8. Hence PIL 
was intended to be a mechanism through which the grievances of those unable to 
participate in political, administrative and legal processes could be addressed. However, 
the advent of the PIL subsequently opened up the possibility of the courts relaxing 
procedural requirements in cases, which involved ‘broad’ public interest issues 9 
involving environment, consumer affairs, property rights, the practices of municipal 
corporations, educational institutions, politicians and political parties. In many such 
instances, courts have sought to prescribe public policy outcomes. This widening of 
subject matter has caused Indian judicial activism to be viewed seriously by legal 
scholars10. While there is no denying the view that courts are supposed to give new 
meaning to existing provisions so as to suit the changing social or economic conditions, 
yet there is a general fear that “such activism can be positive as well as negative”. 
Following Anant and Singh (2002), we shall describe judicial activism in three forms- 
interpretational, legislative and executive - each having distinct implications on 
allocation. 
The constitution can be viewed as an incomplete contract; hence courts are often called 
upon to interpret the constitution. This in itself can be viewed as an act of activism 
                                                 
7 Among many other cases see, for example, for under trail prisoners: Hussainara Khatoon v. Bihar 1979 
SC 1360; prison inmates: Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration AIR 1982 SC 1473; remand homes: Munna 
v. State of U.P AIR 1982 SC 806; women in protective custody: Dr. Upendra Baxi v. U.P (1983) 2 SCC 
308.  
8See for example Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India (1984) 3 SCC 161 and Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. India 
AIR 1992 SC 38 
9 See Ahuja (1997). 
10 See Sathe (2002) for a detailed and scholarly analysis of judicial activism in India. 
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(created by design) to substitute a judicial outcome for the resolution of a problem 
through legislative enactment. In India, the constitution has given the Parliament the 
power to amend constitution without changing the ‘basic structure’. This has often 
resulted in the Parliament taking recourse to an unfettered right to amend the 
constitution 11 . However, in a series of cases the Supreme Court has tried to give 
operational meaning to the ‘basic structure’ and has analysed (limited) the power of the 
Parliament to amend the constitution12 .  It is clear that such forms of activism are 
unavoidable and are an integral part of the constitutional design.  
An example of legislative judicial activism is to be found in the famous judgment13 of 
Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan. In this case the Supreme Court specified a model law to 
prevent sexual harassment. This was done to remedy the inadequacy of the existing legal 
system where the civil and penal law in India does not protect women from sexual 
harassment in the work place.  
There have been many instances of executive judicial activism in the recent past. In the 
late 80s, the court admitted a PIL aimed at reducing vehicular pollution in Delhi. In 
response to this PIL, the Supreme Court proceeded to issue a number of wide ranging 
policy directives. These include restrictions on the plying of all old (more than 15 years) 
commercial vehicles; ban on supply of loose 2T oils at petrol stations and service 
garages; augmentation of public transport; elimination of leaded petrol from NCT of 
Delhi; replacement of all pre-1990 auto-rickshaws and taxis with new vehicles on clean 
fuels; steady conversion of the entire city bus fleet (DTC and private) to single fuel mode 
on CNG; new Inter State Bus Terminals to be built at entry points in the north and south-
west to avoid pollution due to entry of inter-state buses; and even some specific 
restrictions on school buses.14 It is clear that all these relate to the choice of technology, 
inputs of production, location of bus stations- decisions to be made by the executive 
                                                 
11 For instance when the Supreme Court struck down the reservation of seats in medical and engineering 
colleges on a communal basis, (State of Madras v. Champakam Durairajan AIR 1951 SC 226) the 
executive and the legislature responded by amending the Constitution and adding Article 15(4) and 16(4) to 
enable the government to make communal reservations.    
12 See  Keshavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala (AIR 1973 SC 1461), State Of Bihar & Anr. Vs Bal 
Mukund Sah & Ors, 2000 4 SCC 640. For example, the Supreme Court held that the conditions for 
appointment of judges can not be amended even by constitutional amendments. 
13 (1997) 6 SCC 241 
14 Interim orders dated 28th July 1998 and 22nd Sept. 1998  on  Writ Petition (Civil) No. 130295/1985 put in 
front of the Supreme Court by M.M. Mehta.  
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branch of the government after careful and detailed study of the economic 
consequences15.  
The previous discussion highlighted the trend and nature of judicial activism in India. It 
is not our intention to claim that all forms of activism are good (or bad); rather we are 
interested in analysing the process itself.   
3. The Model 
In this section, we consider a very simple and specialised model. The model is not 
designed to capture the richness of activism described in the previous section. However, 
we hope to show that it is not desirable to judge activism on a case by case basis. Some 
forms of activism in fact do lead to welfare increase but once activism becomes an 
institution itself the result could be excessive activism and abuse of privileges leading to 
welfare loss.  
Suppose a public good is to be produced by a firm with private information about its cost 
and procured by the constitution (henceforth called the principal). The social benefit from 
this good is S and the cost of production is given by C = θq, where θ is the cost parameter 
and q is the quantity16. We shall normalise the total quantity, q = 1. Cost parameter is 
given by θ = θ  – (θ_ 1+ θ2), where θi ∈ {0, ∆θ}, i∈{1,2}. Hence, depending on the 
realisation of θi, θ can take three values, θ ,θ  or ˆ θ  where =  θˆ θ - ∆θ and   θ = θ -2∆θ.  
The random variables θi, are drawn independently from the same distribution so that 
Pr(θi=∆θ) = υ. We shall assume that the good is always desirable. The firm’s utility 
function is given by U(θ) = t –C(θ), where t is the transfer payment by the principal to the 
firm. The principal maximizes the following social welfare function subject to the firm’s 
participation constraint being satisfied, U(θ)≥ 0.  Social welfare17 is given by 
(1)  SW =  S – (1+λ)t  
where λ is the shadow cost of public funds. It is clear that in this simple case, the 
principal would simply minimise the total transfers. 
                                                 
15 See Anant and Singh (2002) for a critique. 
16 This is a simpler and slightly modified version of Laffont and Martimort (1999), see Laffont (2000) and 
Tirole (1992) also. 
17 We have not included the utility of the firm in the welfare. But it can be done without any change to the 
results. SW = S – (1+λ)t + U = S – (1+λ)(U+θq) + U = S –(1+λ)θq –λU. 
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The principal employs politicians/executive/judiciary (henceforth called supervisors) to 
supervise the firm and obtain information on θ. There is an independent supervision 
technology which generates hard information on θi. This technology generates signals σi 
with the following probabilities; 
(2)  Pr(σi = ∆θθi = ∆θ) = ζ and Pr(σi = φθi = ∆θ) = 1-ζ, 
Pr(σi = ∆θ) = υζ and Pr(σi = φ)= (1-υζ ). 
3.1 Supervisors 
Only supervisors observe signals σi and they are supposed to report the signals to the 
principal. They derive their power from being able to manipulate this information. In our 
case, this ability is somewhat limited by the hard nature of this information. We shall 
assume that the supervisor can only hide information but is not able to distort it in any 
other way. Let r denote the report by the supervisor, r ∈ {φ, ∆θ}. 
It is obvious that the supervisor’s report will determine the principal’s policy towards the 
firm. Consider a case where the supervisor(s) always report truthfully.  Consider the state 
σ1 = σ2 = ∆θ; this is likely to happen with probability (υζ)2.  Then maximizing SW 
subject to the constraint U = (θ -t)≥0 would lead to the optimal policy of t = θ  and U = 
0. With probability 2 υζ (1- υζ), we have another state, σi = φ and σj = ∆θ where i≠j, i,j 
∈{1,2}. Then the optimal policy18 would be t = θ , U( ) = 0 and U(ˆ θˆ θ ) = ∆θ. With 
probability (1- υζ)2, both the signals yield nothing, σ1 = σ2= φ. Then the principal would 
choose t = θ , U(θ ) = 0, U( θ )= ∆θ and U(ˆ θ ) = 2∆θ.  Whenever, the principal is not 
fully informed, the firm gets a rent with positive probability (depending on the type) and 
this is socially costly. 
We have two types of supervisors- benevolent and non-benevolent. Benevolent 
supervisors have the same objective as the principal. Non-benevolent supervisors seek to 
maximize their own payoff. The principal does not know the type of the supervisor and 
we assume that there is no screening mechanism to separate the two types. The 
probability of a supervisor being benevolent is δ, 0≤δ≤1. As can be seen from the 
                                                 
18 Given the reports, principal can revise beliefs about the firm’s type but in our simple case that does not 
affect the optimal policy. Since the project is always desirable and q is fixed, the principal is not able to 
discriminate between different possible types. 
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previous paragraph, whenever σi = ∆θ and the supervisor reports r = φ, the firm19 gains 
∆θ. Hence the supervisor and the firm can collude-firm bribing the supervisor for a null 
report. As is standard in the literature, we assume that the supervisor has all the 
bargaining power and can appropriate the entire rent. However, there is a transaction cost 
associated with bribery so that a bribe of ∆θ is worth k∆θ to the supervisor, where k< 1.  
Hence the non-benevolent supervisor can get k∆θ by colluding with the firm. However, 
the principal can stipulate payments s to the supervisor based on the reports r so that 
collusion is prevented.   
3.2 Separation of powers 
In this paper we take separation of powers as given and we do not seek to prove its 
optimality20. As has been shown by Laffont (2000), separation of powers can be shown to 
be optimal in a variety of circumstances. Separation of powers implies that supervisor 1 
(called S1) has access to information technology 1 which generates signal σ1 about θ1. 
Likewise, supervisor 2 (called S2) observes σ2. The principal specifies transfers t and s as 
functions of the reports (r1,r2) by S1 and S2, t = t(r1,r2) and sj =sj(r1,r2), j=1,2.  
The game proceeds as follows. (0) A constitution is set up; the principal announces the 
contract. (1) Nature determines the type of the firm (realisation of θ) and the type of the 
supervisor (benevolent or not). (2) The supervisors observe their respective signals. Firms 
also learn the type of the supervisor(s) and what they have observed. (3) The firm and the 
supervisor can collude on a side contract21.  (4) The supervisors submit their reports to 
the principal and transfers are implemented according to the principal’s contract. 
Note that the principal is unable to condition transfers on the type of the supervisor. This 
means that if the principal stipulates a reward for reporting ∆θ, then it would be paid to 
                                                 
19 The gains are additive. If one report is ∆θ and the other is φ, the most efficient firm gains ∆θ. If both 
reports are φ, the firm gains 2∆θ.  Strictly speaking we don’t need this additive structure. A more plausible 
case would be when the gain from two null reports exceeds the sum of gains from null reports by 1 and 2. 
This formulation is for simplicity. 
20 One can assume that the joint observation technology is inefficient compared to separate observation 
technology. We shall be introducing a similar assumption later in the paper in the context of the activist 
technology. 
21 Given our simple model and the additive structure, the gain from collusion to supervisor 1 is always k∆θ, 
where k is the inverse of the transaction cost. This holds,  irrespective of the nature of interaction between 
the firm and supervisor 2. 
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the benevolent supervisor as well. Hence the first decision of the principal is whether to 
achieve collusion-proof outcome or not. 
If δ is very high, it might be optimal to allow collusion between non-benevolent 
supervisor and the firm. Let us call it the collusion case and denote welfare by WC. 
Similarly, WNC is the welfare when no collusion is allowed. 
Proposition 1: Under separation, the principal would choose a collusion-proof 
mechanism for low values of δ. The optimal transfers would be given by  
t(φ,φ) = θ , t(φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,φ) =  , t(∆θ,∆θ) = θˆ θ , s(φ) = 0 and s(∆θ) = k∆θ. 
Proof:  First, as has been discussed earlier the transfers to the firm in different states are 
optimal given that the project is always desirable and the level of the public good (q) is 
fixed. Second, it can be checked that these transfers would lead to an outcome (Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium) where the supervisors always report truthfully.  Suppose, σ1 = ∆θ. The 
benefit to the firm from colluding with S1 depends on several factors- firm’s type, S2’s 
type and S2’s observation σ2. Suppose the firm’s type is θ  and σ2 = φ. Truthful reporting 
by S1 would lead to the firm getting a rent of ∆θ, where as collusion would lead to a rent 
of 2∆θ. Hence gain from collusion with S1 is ∆θ. On the other hand, if the type is θ  and 
σ2 = ∆θ and if S2 will report truthfully (which it will, given the transfers), the gain from 
collusion is again ∆θ. Last, if the firm’s type isθ , then again the gain from collusion is 
∆θ. Hence, a reward of k∆θ would induce the supervisor to report truthfully. Hence 
welfare would be given by 
ˆ
(3)  WNC = S – {1+λ}{(υζ )2(θ+2k∆θ) + 2(υζ)(1-υζ)( +k∆θ) + (1-υζ )θˆ 2 θ } 
Consider the other case when collusion is allowed in equilibrium. It is clear that s(∆θ) = 
0, since the benevolent supervisors are going to report truthfully even in the absence of 
any payment. Suppose supervisors have been assigned to the different information 
technologies randomly. So the probability of S1 (S2) being benevolent is δ. First consider 
the state where both S1 and S2 are benevolent. This happens with probability δ2. The 
corresponding welfare would be  
(4) S - {1+λ}{(υζ )2(θ ) + 2(υζ)(1-υζ)( ) + (1-υζ )θˆ 2 θ }.  
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Consider the sate where S1 is benevolent and S2 is non-benevolent. This occurs with 
probability δ(1-δ).  In this state, if σ1= σ2 = ∆θ, then t = θ . We can also have σˆ 1=∆θ and 
σ2 = φ with probability υζ (1- υζ) leading to t = θ . But if σˆ 1 = φ and σ2 = ∆θ, then t = θ .  
Of course, with probability (1- υζ)2 both observe nothing and it does not matter whether 
S1 or S2 is benevolent.  The case of non-benevolent S1 and benevolent S2 is exactly 
similar. So the state with only one benevolent supervisor occurs with probability 2δ(1-δ) 
and welfare in this state would be  
(5) S - {1+λ}{(υζ )2(θ ) + (υζ)(1-υζ)( θ+ ˆ ˆ θ ) + (1-υζ )2 θ }.  
Lastly the state where both S1 and S2 are non-benevolent occurs with probability (1-δ)2. 
In this sate it does not matter whether the supervisors observe anything or not as the 
principal would always receive a report of φ and t = θ .  
Hence welfare under collusion would be given by 
(6) WC = S – [δ2 {1+λ}{(υζ )2(θ ) + 2(υζ)(1-υζ)( θ ) + (1-υζ )ˆ 2 θ }+ 2δ(1-δ) 
{1+λ}{(υζ )2( ) + (υζ)(1-υζ)( θ+ θˆ ˆ θ ) + (1-υζ )2 θ }+ (1-δ)2 {1+λ}{θ }. 
It can be verified that WNC ≥ WC if and only if the following condition is satisfied 
(7) 2(υζ)2∆θ (1-δ) + 2 υζ(1-υζ)∆θ(1-δ) - 2υζ∆θk ≥ 0 
The first two terms (in 7) are the losses to the principal when the signal is informative but 
collusion takes place between the firm and non-benevolent supervisor(s). The third term 
is the cost of preventing collusion. Note that it does not have any δ term because all 
supervisors receive the payment. 
The above condition can be written as 
(8) δ ≤ 1-k. 
 (QED) 
 
As one would expect, it is always desirable to prevent collusion if benevolence level is 
low (δ low) and transaction cost associated with collusion is high (k low). This however 
ignores the (social) transaction costs associated with bribery. Moreover, with a more 
general welfare function it will depend on the shadow cost of public funds as well.  
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4. Activism 
 
In general, activism can be defined as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-
making into the domain of some other institution. This presupposes that the extension by 
the activist institution is indeed feasible. This feasibility depends on the privileges 
granted by the constitution. Here we make a distinction between privileges and tasks. An 
institution is assigned a task when the incentive mechanism for the institution depends 
solely on the task.  Success or failure will be ascertained solely in reference to the task. 
Similar incentive considerations do not hold for privileges. 
In the present model, reporting σ1 is the sole task of S1 and incentive payments depend 
on the nature of report r1. However, S1 can enjoy certain privileges in terms of 
overseeing σ2 as well, though there will be no explicit provision of incentive payments.  
Suppose there is another information technology which enables S1 to observe a signal µ 
of σ2, in addition to signal σ1 of θ1.  For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of µ is 
conditional on σ2 = ∆θ. This technology has the following property; 
(9)  Pr(σ1 = ∆θθ1 = ∆θ) = ρ and Pr(σ1 = φθ1 = ∆θ) = 1-ρ, 
Pr(µ = ∆θσ2 = ∆θ) = β and Pr(µ = φσ2 = ∆θ) = 1-β. 
We shall denote this activist technology as ρ-technology and refer to the earlier 
technology as ζ-technology. We assume that this activist technology leads to some 
dilution in one’s own task, so ρ ≤ ζ22.  In addition, we assume that S2 also observes the 
realization of µ. Supervisors choose the technology and their technology choice is not 
observable to the principal. This adds an additional stage to the game (described on page 
8), where the supervisor chooses the technology prior to stage (2) but after stage (1). This 
means that different supervisors can choose different technologies and as will be shown 
below, this will be crucial to our analysis of activism.  
4.1 Limited Activism 
Recall that our constitution does not make any use of the benevolent supervisors. That 
can change in the light of this alternative technology. We can modify the earlier 
constitution along the following lines.  Let S1 be endowed with this technology and it can 
                                                 
22 This is consistent with the separation of powers argument. Moreover, it ties well with the functional 
separation. The nature of information gathering in the two different tasks is different and there is some 
benefit to specialisation. 
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report on µ in addition to its own task of reporting signal σ1. We denote this activist 
report by z; z∈{∆θ,φ}.  Suppose transfer payments to S2 are as follows. Supervisor 2 
gets s2>0 only if z = φ and r2 = ∆θ; and s2 = 0 otherwise. Transfer payment to S1 does not 
depend on z. This means that whenever σ2 = ∆θ and S1 reports z, with probability β, the 
principal does not have to pay a positive s2 to S2. Hence preventing collusion can be less 
costly. This has been achieved by giving S1 the privilege23 of overseeing S2. However, 
there is a trade off in the sense that θ1 is observed with a smaller probability.  
But will S1 be willing to choose the activist technology? Since ρ ≤ ζ, the supervisor is 
going to get s1 with a smaller probability. Moreover, a report of z = ∆θ does not fetch 
anything to the supervisor. Hence a non-benevolent supervisor may not be interested in 
switching from the ζ-technology. For the benevolent supervisors, since their objective is 
aligned with that of the principal, they would choose the ρ-technology if there is an 
increase in welfare even though their own receipts might go down. We first consider the 
case where only the benevolent supervisors choose to be activist; and call this a case of 
limited activism and denote the corresponding welfare by WLA. 
We shall consider both symmetric and asymmetric cases. In the symmetric case, both 
supervisors (S1 and S2) have access to the activist technology and both have the 
(provision) privileges to report on the other’s signal. So, S1 observes and reports z2 
(signal of σ2) and similarly S2 reports z1 (signal of σ1)24. The transfers sj depend on 
reports of both rj and zj, j = 1,2.  We shall allow for the degree of benevolence (δ1,δ2) to 
be different between S1 and S2. However, whenever it does not matter, we shall take δ1 = 
δ2 = δ. We shall consider the asymmetric case first. We have the following proposition.   
Proposition 2: Limited activism can be welfare increasing if the extent of information 
loss in the task (ζ-ρ) is not too large and the information gain from the activist policy (β) 
is not too small. 
Proof: Suppose, S1 has access to the ρ-technology.  Alternatively, S2 has no provision 
(privilege) for such reports. It can be easily checked that the level of transfers remain the 
same for the firm, t(φ,φ) = θ , t(φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,φ) = θ  and t(∆θ,∆θ) = ˆ θ . For the 
                                                 
23 Suppose, s2 does not depend on z , then it does not matter whether S1 has access to the ρ-technology or 
not. 
24 Notice that S1 reports r1 and z2- referring to θ1 and signal µ2 of θ2. Similarly for S2. 
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supervisors, there is no change in transfers to S1, s1(φ) = 0 and s1(∆θ) = k∆θ. However, as 
discussed earlier, the second supervisor’s transfer depends on S1’s report of z2 as well. 
Hence, s2(z2 = ∆θ) = 0 and s2(z2 = φ, r2 = ∆θ) = k∆θ. Clearly, the principal would reduce 
its cost by δ1(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ).   
But the ρ-technology is less informative about own signal θ1 and that would lead to a 
welfare loss. Since only the benevolent supervisors are choosing the ρ-technology, the 
reduction in probability with which ∆θ is observed is δ1υ(ζ-ρ). Moreover, in our case the 
gain to the principal from information about θ is additive. If r2 = ∆θ, and S1 also reports 
∆θ, then t = θ , so the welfare gain will be ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ). Similarly, when r2 = φ, and r1 = 
∆θ, then t = θ  and welfare gain will be ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ). Hence the loss in welfare due to the 
ρ-technology will be given by δ
ˆ
1υ(ζ-ρ) ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ). 
Hence overall welfare will go up, WNC ≤ WLA ,  if and only if  
(10) δ(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) ≥ δυ(ζ-ρ) ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ) 
or,  ζkβ ≥ (ζ-ρ)(1-k). 
Clearly this is satisfied if for a given k, (ζ-ρ) is low and β is high.  
(QED) 
It is clear that for extreme low values of k this above condition is unlikely to be satisfied 
and we are unlikely to see any activism. When k is close to 1, there is virtually no 
transaction cost associated with collusion; the cost of preventing collusion is very high 
and hence activism raises welfare by lowering this cost. Hence we are likely to see more 
activism in a developing economy context where the transaction cost might be low25. For 
later comparisons, consider the numerical example with ζ = 0.8, ρ = 0.7, β = 0.6 and k = 
½. For these parameter values, condition (10) is satisfied and we shall see limited 
activism. 
Note 1- The benevolent supervisors are choosing the ρ-technology because activism leads 
to greater welfare. Their own receipts go down by υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ. This can be justified by 
                                                 
25 See Laffont and Meleu (2001) for a related argument concerning the value of separation of powers when 
transaction costs are low. However, in our case, if k is very high we might not have any collusion 
prevention and the relevant welfare is Wc. 
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many different types of objective function26. One such objective function would be an 
weighted average of own receipts and social welfare. It must be pointed out that these 
supervisors are not just honest but also actively care about social welfare. It is quite 
possible to have honest supervisors who would never collude with the firm but also 
would never choose a technology that gives them lower payoff.  Since the benevolent 
supervisors care so much about welfare, one might wonder why don’t they simply 
announce their type and refuse the transfer to begin with. Even though we have not 
explored this issue at length, preliminary analysis suggests that such a procedure would 
lead to the use of such announcement by the principal and it is unlikely that both types 
(benevolent and non-benevolent) can be fully separated in equilibrium.  
Note 2- Even though welfare goes up, the firm is better off. Welfare goes up because 
transfers to both types (more importantly S2) go down. But the firm collects the rent with 
a greater probability. 
4.2 Activism in the Collusion case 
Activism can arise in the collusion case as well. Suppose the principal makes no 
incentive payments to the supervisors and allows some collusion to take place. It is clear 
that all the non-benevolent supervisors will collude with the firm and always report φ, 
whenever σ = ∆θ.  The benevolent supervisors will always report truthfully. Now 
consider the case where S1 can choose the activist technology. In that case, the principal 
can condition its transfers to the firm on reports r1, r2 and z2.  More specifically, let 
t(r1,r2,z2) be given by 
t(φ,φ,φ) = θ , t(φ,∆θ,φ) = t(∆θ,φ,φ) =t(φ,φ,∆θ) =  , t(∆θ,φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,∆θ,φ) = θˆ θ . 
This means that the non-benevolent S2 can collude with the firm less often. If S1 is 
benevolent and successfully observes µ = ∆θ, then the firm does not gain anything by 
colluding and the principal does not have to leave excess rent to the firm (∆θ). Since 
benevolent S2 will report truthfully in any case, activist reporting by S1 is valuable to the 
principal to the extent S2 is non-benevolent. Hence benevolent S1 will choose the activist 
technology only when δ2 is low. We can state this as a corollary to Proposition 2. 
                                                 
26 We can consider an intermediate case where report of z = ∆θ would fetch some receipts but lower than 
k∆θ. But that is not consistent with our interpretation of tasks and pure privileges. 
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Corollary 3: Suppose the original constitution has no provision for incentive payments 
for prevention of collusion. Activism (by benevolent S1) is more likely if fraction of non-
benevolent S2 is high.   
4.3 Excessive Activism 
Even though we considered the asymmetric case with one supervisor having access to 
privileges and activist information technology, it is clear that an extension to the 
symmetric case is quite straightforward. In some sense, most constitutions will allow for 
some form limited activism of the kind we have discussed above. However, the key to the 
previous analysis is the fact that the non-benevolent supervisors continue to use the ζ-
technology.  This however need not be the case.  
Suppose a non-benevolent S1 chooses the ρ-technology and µ2 = ∆θ.  If S2 is benevolent, 
S1 receives no payment. However, if S2 is non-benevolent, then we have a situation 
where S1’s observation can fetch some returns to S1.  S2 can get k∆θ by reporting r2= ∆θ 
only when S1 reports z2 = φ. Hence there is scope for collusion between S1 and S2 in this 
case.   
Earlier, we assumed that the parameter k was always less than 1 because of the presence 
of transaction cost associated with collusion between the firm and the supervisor. One 
possible explanation for this transaction cost relates to the probable detection of the 
firm’s type at some stage. If θj were to be discovered, then the principal can investigate 
and find out that bribery took place between the firm and supervisor j. If we continue 
with this interpretation, then collusion between the two supervisors will have no such 
transaction cost when z2 = φ and r2 = ∆θ. On the other hand, if there is a cost associated 
with any side transfer (transfers other than stipulated by the principal), then there will be 
a transaction cost associated with this collusion as well.  
 Before we discuss the possible outcomes, we can rule out certain other outcomes. 
Consider the state where both S1 and S2 are non-benevolent and σ2 = µ2 = ∆θ. It will 
never be the case that both S1 and S2 will report truthfully and receive nothing. By 
colluding there is a gain of k∆θ to be shared. Similarly, it is not possible that only the 
firm and S2 will collude, because such collusion will not generate any gain for them if S1 
reports z2 = ∆θ. Following such a report, the principal would implement the optimal 
transfer to the firm based on θ2 = ∆θ. Hence the following two outcomes are possible. 
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Case 1: First, S1 receives a side transfer from S2 to report z2 = φ and S2 reports r2 = ∆θ. 
The principal receives the information and can implement the optimal transfer as in the 
case where only S2 could observe σ2. Assuming equal bargaining powers and no 
transaction cost, both will receive k∆θ/2. Hence there is no welfare loss as such in this 
state, except that overall welfare might go down because of the information loss about θ1.  
Case 2: However, this assumes that side transfers are possible between supervisors and 
the supervisors can collude leaving the firm out. Since firm has all the information about 
S1 and S2, such a case does not seem very plausible. There is always some scope for the 
firm to leak the information regarding the collusion between the two supervisors. 
Suppose the supervisors recognise this and discount their total gain from collusion by 
some parameter ks <1. In that case, we could have collusion between S1, S2 and the firm.  
Then, both supervisors will report φ and receive payments from the firm. For simplicity 
we assume that the supervisors still have all the bargaining power and they receive ∆θ/2 
each27. In this case, there is welfare loss because the principal does not receive the 
information. Both cases are fine so far as our main result is concerned.  
This raises the prospect of non-benevolent supervisors opting for the ρ-technology. We 
shall refer to it as excessive activism and denote welfare as WA.  We continue with the 
asymmetric case where only S1 has access to the activist technology. 
Proposition 4: A rise in the proportion of non-benevolent supervisors (lowering of δ2) 
would result in excessive activism. Welfare under excessive activism is lower than the 
welfare under complete separation and no collusion (WA< WNC). 
Proof:  The non-benevolent S1 gains in the state where σ2 = ∆θ, µ2 = ∆θ and S2 is non-
benevolent. Such a state occurs with probability (υζ)β(1-δ2). Given our assumption of 
equal split between the two supervisors, the gain to S1 will be k∆θ/2 in this state. In any 
other state, there is no gain for S1 (compared to the ζ-technology). Rather S1 will loose 
an amount υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ due to the reduced probability of observing θ1. Hence the non-
benevolent S1 will choose the ρ-technology if and only if 
(11)  υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ ≤ (υζ)β(1-δ2)k∆θ/2 
                                                 
27 Alternatively we could assume that each receive one third of the total. Modelling the three-way collusion 
will take us beyond the scope of the present paper. 
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or,  δ2 ≤ 1- βζ
ρ−ζ )(2 = δA. 
Hence a non-benevolent supervisor S1 will find it optimal to choose the ρ-technology 
whenever it faces too many non-benevolent supervisors (S2)28. This suggests that as 
corruption rises in one institution, it leads corrupt supervisors in the other institution to 
be activist to get a share in the rent. 
The welfare implications are easy to see. Recall that in our previous analysis of limited 
activism, benevolent S1’s strategy did not depend on non-benevolent S1’s strategy. We 
can continue to assume that condition (10) is satisfied and the benevolent S1 also chooses 
the activist technology29. For welfare comparisons, we only need to look at the welfare 
changes which follow from the non-benevolent supervisor’s choice of the activist 
technology.  
As in Proposition 2, S1 reports ∆θ with smaller probability and the welfare loss due to 
this will be υ(ζ-ρ) ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ). On the other hand, the gain depends on the nature of 
collusion between S1 and S2 (case 1 and 2).  
Case 1: The principal does not gain anything from the activism of the non-benevolent S1 
whenever S2 is also non-benevolent. However, when S2 is benevolent and S1 is non-
benevolent, the principal saves on the transfer to S2 because there is no collusion 
between benevolent and non-benevolent supervisors. So the gain under excessive 
activism compared to the no activism case is given by 
(12)  δ1(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) + δ2(1-δ1)(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) < (υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) 
Hence welfare goes down compared to WNC if and only if  
(13) υ(ζ-ρ) ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ) > δ1(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) + δ2(1-δ1)(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) 
The above condition can be satisfied even if condition (10) holds, (υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) ≥ υ(ζ-ρ) 
∆θ(1-k)(1+λ). Recall that condition (10) implies that WLA > WNC; hence limited activism 
can raise welfare but excessive activism can lower it at the same time. 
                                                 
28 Using the earlier example, δA = 0.58. If at leaf half of S2 are non-benevolent, then excessive activism 
will arise. 
29 It is however possible that for very low values of δ2 and low k, we can get a situation where benevolent 
S1 will not choose the activist technology but the non-benevolent one will. For example this is true for ζ = 
0.8, ρ = 0.7, β = 0.6, k = 1/6 and δ = ½. However, such a situation will not arise because the principal will 
never have the provision of privileges and hence there will be no scope for activism. 
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Case 2: In this case, non-benevolent S1 and S2 collude with the firm whenever µ2 = ∆θ 
and σ2 = ∆θ. This happens with probability (1-δ1)(1-δ2)β(υζ). The loss to the principal in 
this state would be ∆θ(1-k). Hence the gain to the principal is now smaller compared to 
case 1. The right hand side of inequality (13) will now be lower. Welfare is lower 
compared to WNC if  
(14) υ(ζ-ρ) ∆θ(1-k)(1+λ) 
> δ1(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) + δ2(1-δ1)(υζ)βk∆θ(1+λ) - (1-δ1)(1-δ2)β(υζ) ∆θ(1-k) 
Clearly, (14) and (10) and (11) can all be true simultaneously. That would mean that 
excessive activism is the outcome and it reduces welfare. This is despite the fact limited 
activism was welfare improving30.  
(QED) 
Inequality (11) is likely to hold for low values of δ. This suggest that as corruption 
increases and there are more non-benevolent supervisors, activism is no more limited to 
the benevolent and it is no more welfare improving. In some sense the creation of 
privileges leads to its misuse and the benefit gets reversed. 
 
5: Activism by Multiple Institutions 
 
In this section, we shall consider the symmetric case with both S1 and S2 having access 
to the activist technology and privileges. Recall that S1 reports z2 about σ2 and S2 reports 
z1 about σ1. The transfer payments t(r1,r2), sj(rj,zi) are same as before. For the firm, t(φ,φ) 
= θ , t(φ,∆θ) = t(∆θ,φ) = θ  and t(∆θ,∆θ) = ˆ θ . For the supervisors, s1( z2 = ∆θ) = 0, s1(z2 = 
φ, r1= ∆θ) = k∆θ and s2( z1 = ∆θ) = 0, s2(z1 = φ, r2 = ∆θ) = k∆θ. 
 So far as limited activism is concerned, this does not alter the basic analysis too much. 
The net benefit of limited activism decreases if the other supervisor is also an activist31. If 
(ζ-ρ) is not very large, benevolent supervisors from both institutions (S1 and S2) will 
                                                 
30 Since welfare goes down, will the benevolent supervisors choose the ρ-technology? The answer is yes, 
because their choice of ζ-technology would lead to a further reduction. The proposition will be reinforced if 
only the non-benevolent chooses the ρ-technology and the benevolents do not. 
31 The condition for benevolent S1 to choose activist technology when S2 (both benevolent and non-
benevolent) chooses to be activist will be ρkβ > (ζ-ρ)(1-k) instead of (9). 
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choose to be activist and this raises welfare. However, excessive activism is more likely 
when both the institutions have access to activist technology and privileges.  
Excessive activism can materialize even when condition (11) is not satisfied. Notice that 
condition (11) makes the choice of ρ-technology a dominant strategy for the non-
benevolent supervisor (irrespective of what other supervisor does). In a symmetric case, 
where S2 also has access to such technology we can get excessive activism as a Nash 
equilibrium. To see this, suppose S2 chooses the ρ-technology. Consider the state where 
σ1 = ∆θ; unlike the asymmetric case of the previous section, now S1 is not guaranteed 
k∆θ.  If S2 is non-benevolent S1 gets k∆θ with probability (1-β) and k∆θ/2 (assuming 
equal split) with probability β. If S2 is benevolent, S1 gets nothing with probability β. 
This means S1’s expected income from its own task is now considerably lower because 
of S2’s activism. Hence in switching from ζ- technology to ρ-technology, its loss is also 
lower. Activism by one institution affects the incentives of other institutions as well; this 
can lead to the spread of activist policy.  
Consider first the case where only benevolent S2 is activist. It is clear that benevolent S1 
is also an activist. For the non-benevolent S1, the loss from switching to an activist policy 
would be υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ (1-δ2β). This is certainly less than the potential loss (υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ) it 
faced when S2 was not an activist. On the other hand its gain from activism remains the 
same. The benefit from activism is realized only from the non-benevolent S2 who 
continues to choose the ζ-technology. Hence the non-benevolent S1 will choose to be an 
activist if and only if 
(15) υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ (1-δ2β)  ≤ (υζ)β(1-δ2)k∆θ/2 
Since the r.h.s. of (15) is same as r.h.s of (11) and the l.h.s of (15) is smaller, this 
inequality (15) will be satisfied whenever (11) is satisfied but not vice versa. Hence we 
can have a situation where (15) holds but (11) does not hold.  
In fact, the non-benevolent S1’s incentive to choose the activist technology remains 
unchanged if the non-benevolent S2, in addition to the benevolent S2, also chooses the 
activist technology. Whenever, non-benevolent S2 discovers µ1, non-benevolent S1 has to 
pay half of its transfer. Hence the expected income from own task, hence the loss from 
switching from ζ-technology to ρ-technology is reduced further. On the other hand the 
expected rent from activism also goes down if non-benevolent S2 choose the ρ-
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technology. Recall that benefits of activism is always conditional on the  realisation of σ. 
In fact its loss will be υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ (1-β) + υ(ζ-ρ)(1-δ2)βk∆θ/2. On the other hand its gain is 
given by (υρ)β(1-δ2)k∆θ/2. Hence, given S2’s choice ρ-technology, S1 will choose ρ-
technology if and only if 
(16)  υ(ζ-ρ)k∆θ (1-β) + υ(ζ-ρ)(1-δ2)βk∆θ/2 ≤ (υρ)β(1-δ2)k∆θ/2 
or,  δ2 ≤ 1- )2/(
))(1(
ζ−ρβ
ρ−ζβ−  = δN 
Comparing with previous conditions, it is clear that (15) and (16) are equivalent and these 
are implied by (11). 
For example, let ζ = 0.8, ρ = 0.7, β = 0.5. A non-benevolent S1 chooses the activist 
technology even when S2 stays with the ζ-technology if δ2 <1/2. When faced with a 
completely activist S2 or only benevolent activist S2, the non-benevolent S1 will choose 
activist technology if δ2< 2/3. Whenever, 1/2 < δ2 < 2/3, non-benevolent S1 will choose 
activist technology only when benevolent S2 also chooses to be activist. Since excessive 
activism can be welfare reducing, this introduces a trade off between encouraging limited 
activism by more than one institutions and avoiding excessive activism. We can 
summarise this in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5: When both the institutions are granted activist privileges, some form of 
excessive activism can arise. In such situations, the principal might prefer to withdraw 
the privileges of one institution. In addition, the institution with such activist privileges 
might be the one with fewer benevolent supervisors. 
Proof: Consider the previous example with ζ = 0.8, ρ = 0.7, β = 0.5, δ2 = 0.6 and k =1/3. 
Suppose both supervisors have access to the activist technology and both have the 
privilege to report on the other’s signal. For this set of parameter values, the benevolent 
supervisors (both S1 and S2) will always choose the activist technology irrespective of 
whether other non-benevolent supervisors choose to be activist or not. Now consider the 
non-benevolent S1’s choice of technology. Following the discussion of the previous 
paragraph, for δ1 < 2/3, non-benevolent S1 will also choose to be activist. Hence we have 
an excessive activism outcome. On the other hand, by withdrawing privileges for S2 (or 
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S1 if δ1>1/2), we have an outcome where only the benevolent S1 will choose the activist 
technology.  
Suppose δ1 is very low, say δ1 = 0.4. This means that in the symmetric privileges case, 
both S1 and S2 are completely activist. By withdrawing S2’s privileges, activism is 
confined to only benevolent S1.  The principal loses the benefit from benevolent S2’s 
activism but gains in terms preventing ungainly activism by non-benevolent S1 and S2. 
While evaluating non-benevolent supervisor’s activism, we assume that case 1 of 
proposition 3 holds. Let WS and WAS refer to the welfare under symmetric (complete 
excessive activism) and asymmetric (limited activism by benevolent S1) cases 
respectively. It can be shown that  
WAS – WS =  δ1(ζ-ρ)υβk∆θ+ υ(ζ-ρ)∆θ(1-k)+ (1-δ1)(ζ-ρ)υ∆θ(1-k) - υρβk∆θ(δ2+(1-δ2)δ1) – 
(1-δ1)δ2υρβk∆θ. 
The last two terms refer to the benefits of activism by S2 and non-benevolent S1. The 
second and third terms refer to the cost of (in terms of information loss) activism by S2 
and non-benevolent S1. The first term refers to the excess benefit to benevolent S1’s 
activism because of the change in S2’s technology. It is easy to check that for the 
parameter values and δ1 = 0.4, WAS > WS. Hence, the principal is better off withdrawing 
S2’s privileges.  
Note that, since δ1< 0.5, the non-benevolent S2 will always choose to be activist 
irrespective of whether S1 is activist or not. Hence in this case if the principal has to grant 
privileges to only one of the institutions, it has to be S1. Granting privileges to S2 will 
lead to activism by non-benevolent S2 as well. Let W1 and W2 denote the welfare under 
privileges to S1 and S2 respectively. Essentially we are comparing the net benefits of 
limited activism by S1 and net benefits of excessive activism32 by S2. Since the fraction 
of benevolent S1 is lower, the benefit of limited activism is also lower. On the other hand, 
benefit of limited activism by S2 is higher but it comes with activism by the non-
benevolent S2, which reduces the net benefits. It can be checked33 that for the parameter 
                                                 
32 Note that this is not in conflict with proposition 3. Net benefits of excessive activism need not always be 
negative. Since δ2 is high, excessive activism by S2 is worse than limited activism by S2 but it is better than 
no activism. 
33 W1-W2 = δ1υ∆θ(1+λ) {ζβk – (ζ-ρ)(1-k)} - υ∆θ(1+λ){δ2ζβk +(1-δ2)δ1ζβk – (ζ-ρ)(1-k)} > 0 
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values given in this example, W1 > W2. Hence the institution with fewer benevolent 
supervisors is granted the privileges.  
[QED] 
For very low values of δ  (δ≤δA),  excessive activism is the only equilibrium. Similarly, 
for relatively high values of δ (δ > δN), limited activism is the only equilibrium. In the 
intermediate range (like the example in the proposition) a mixture is possible. In sum, we 
can conclude that as corruption rises and there are more non-benevolent supervisors, 
excessive activism seems more likely.   
6. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis shows that activism can be good but it can also spread itself and result in 
welfare loss. Given the specialised nature of our model, the propositions have to be 
viewed with some reservations. But the general message can be applied to various 
situations. In the light of our discussion (section 2) of judicial activism, it can be said that 
the failure of other institutions like the Parliament and the government machinery has led 
to activist policy by the judiciary. This would be in line with our Corollary 3. In that 
sense, the role of judiciary has been laudable. However, this has led to a general 
perception that judiciary is supposed to play such an active role on a regular basis. Rather 
than focusing on how to improve working of other institutions, focus has shifted how to 
enlarge the scope of judicial activism. This is a worrying trend and at some point will 
undermine the basic separation of powers.  Moreover, there is no reason to believe that 
judiciary is and will be seeking to maxmise social welfare. As our model shows, when 
such benevolence is in short supply, the result will be excessive activism (Proposition 4). 
Judicial activism can encourage other institutions to be activist as well (Proposition 5). 
Political interference in the judicial process is a case such activism in this context. 
We have considered the case where collusion prevention cost plays a crucial role. This 
presumes that benevolence level is not very high to begin with (Proposition 1). One could 
have the opposite situation where only a small fraction is non-benevolent and then there 
would be no need to have any incentive payment. In this case, activism is still possible 
but can never be excessive (since δ is very high).  But this is precisely the situation where 
benefit of activism is not very high (Corollary 3). This suggests that issues related to 
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activism are likely to be of greater importance to developing economies where corruption 
levels are high.  
It would be interesting to take a broader perspective and consider all kinds of activism. 
This would include study of activist groups, non-governmental organizations34.  We hope 
to pursue this in future.  
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